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RECENT DECISIONS
The present decision reflects the modern trend requiring the
testator to state explicitly any election he may intend in his wifl.
However, it appears quite possible that a different decision might
be reached in other jurisdictions by allowing recovery in quantum
meruit only for the difference between the legacy and the value
of plaintiff's services.
Frank J. Laski
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN MARRIAGE INCESTUOUS
BY LEX DOMICILIl HELD VALID
An uncle and niece, at all times domiciled in New York, were
married in Rhode Island, where such a marriage is valid. By New
York Dom. ReL Law § 5 (3) a marriage between uncle and niece
is incestuous and void. The niece died, and her husband sought
letters of administration. Held: Letters granted. In re May's
Estate, - App. Div. -, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 345 (3d Dep't 1952).
The English courts hold that a marriage involving an English
domiciliary, forbidden by English law, although valid where performed, is vbid and the children illegitimate. Brook v. Brook, 9
H. L. Cas. 193 (1861) ; In re Paine [1940] 1 Ch. 46. It is generally
said by American courts that a marriage valid by the law of the
place of celebration is valid everywhere. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall,
86 N. Y. 18 (1881); Fensterwald v. Maryland, 129 Md. 131, 93 Atl.
358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916) ; Goonmen, CONFLICT OF LAws 116 (3d

ed. 1949). The marital status is of primary concern to the domiciliary state. Accordingly, this general rule has been limited on
grounds of policy, and marriages otherwise valid have not been
respected where forbidden by the lex domicilii on grounds of
polygamy, Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317
(1st Dep 't 1910) ; miseegenatibn, Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ;
bigamy, Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439 (N. Y. 1856) ; nonage, Ross
v. Bryant, 90 Okl 300, 217 Pac. 364 (1923); incest, United States
v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886 (E. D. Pa. 1901).
By the common consent of Christian nations, marriages between persons in the direct line of ascent and descent and
between brother and sister are incestuous. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Commonwealth v. Lane, 113
Mass. 458 (1873); In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N. W.
428 (1927). However, there is no general agreement as to the
incestuous character of marriages between aunt and nephew,
Martin v. Martin. 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120 (1903); Incuria v.
Incuria,155 Misc. 755, 280 N. Y. Supp. 716 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1935);
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uncle and niece, Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193 (1856); Audley v.
Audley, 196 App. Div. 103, 187 N. Y. Supp. 652 (1st Dep't 1921) ;
first cousins, Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W. By. Co., 170 Minn.
317, 213 N. W. 32 (1927) ; Leefield v. Leefield, 85 Ore. 287, 166 Pac.
952 (1917); STUMBERG, COX-TLICT oF LAws 284 (2d ed. 1951). However, New York has expressly defined what relationships constitute
incest, in Dom. Rel. Law S 5: "A marriage is incestuous and void
whether the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate between either
. . (3) An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew."
*

Whether this statute is to apply to a marriage celebrated
outside of the state might be determined by several factors. The
court in the instant case was probably deterred from such a construction because numerous children had been born of a marriage
unchallenged for three decades. Children of a void marriage,
however, are now deemed legitimate. C.P.A. § 1135 (5). The
court also relied heavily on the supposed authority of Van Voorhis v. Brivtnall, supra, in which a foreign marriage in apparent
contravention of N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 8 was sustained on the
grounds that § 8 was penal in character and there was no legislative intent to give it extraterritorial effect. It is true that .$5
(3), involved in the instant case, is also supported by penal sanctions. N. Y. PENAL L.,w § 1110; N. Y. Dor. REL. LAW § 5. However, subdivisions one and two of § 5, covering ascendants and
descendants and brothers and sisters, clearly have extraterritorial effect, Wightnman . Wightman, supra, although supported
by the same penal sanctions. It is possible, of course, that the
Legislature intended that § 5 (3), adopted at a later time and covering marriages morally and eugenically less odious, should receive
a different construction than § 5 (1-2). However, it seems more
likely that a uniform construction of § 5 was intended. So far as
the penal aspect is concerned, a distinction between the Van Voorhis and instant cases seems possible. In the former, the prohibition
of the marriage was itself the objectionable penal feature, while
in the instant case it is possible to deny the marriage without
invoking the penal sanction. § 5 (3) may be taken as expressive
of the strongest public policy without any penal law being enforced. This policy is meaningless if cases like Campione v. Campione, 210 lisc. 590, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1951), which is
in exact accord with the principal case, are a correct statement of
the law. And it is submitted that a policy based in part on principles of eugenics should not be thwarted by a mere crossing of a
state line.
Marion James Tizzano

